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PRIVATE DATA, PUBLIC SAFETY:
A BOUNDED ACCESS MODEL OF
DISCLOSURE*
MARY D. FAN**
A growing volume of crucial information for protecting public
health and safety is controlled by private-sector entities. The data
are private in two senses—both proprietary and secluded from
scrutiny. Controversies over corporate secrecy, such as sealed
settlements that hide deaths due to product defects or
nondisclosure of potentially hazardous substances, illustrate how
corporate privacy and public safety can conflict. Courts are
conflicted about when to defer to companies’ claims of the right
to keep information private when important public interests are
implicated by the data that companies refuse to disclose. This
Article proposes allowing what it terms “bounded access” to
share private data important to public health and safety with
safeguards for the private interests at stake.
In contrast to mandated public-disclosure regimes, bounded
access would provide information access to trained professionals
capable of effectively using data to detect health and safety harms
while honoring data protections. The paradigmatic audience for
bounded access disclosures is researchers overseen by
institutional review boards and trained in how to minimize
damage to data owners. Information aggregation and deidentification can help protect the anonymity of the private
entities and their product lines, thereby ameliorating the concerns
of private entities regarding prematurely rousing consumer
panic, injuring brand reputation, or destroying trade secrets.
Such bounded access would address the limitations of general
public disclosure, such as conflict with the Fifth Amendment
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takings clause or piling more disclosure on the informationoverloaded consumer. Information would be rich in technical
details to facilitate effective expert analyses rather than pared
down for general public consumption. The proposed approach
thus balances private-sector interests with the public interest in
protecting population health and safety.
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INTRODUCTION
Information is power to govern, protect, and defend.1 To
facilitate democratic decision making and to act as a check on power,
the public can obtain information held by the government under state
and federal sunshine laws.2 Increasingly, however, a treasure trove of
1. Cf., e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF
POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, at ix, 53, 100–09 (1996) (describing the relationship
between information and power and how changes in methods of communication diffuse
power).
2. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote: “Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see also, e.g., Adriana S.
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information on matters affecting public safety and security are
controlled by private-sector entities rather than the government.3
Private-sector companies are generally not subject to sunshine laws
that apply to government actors.4 Even the health and safety
information that companies must report to governmental agencies
can be shielded from disclosure based on claims of trade secrets,
confidentiality, or proprietary information.5 Such data are private in
two senses—both proprietary and secluded from scrutiny.6
Corporations do not have a right to privacy, according to a
longstanding rule.7 The literature on corporate privacy is generally
Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine As Disinfectant: The Effect of State Freedom of
Information Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18, 23–24 (2014) (discussing
the impact of state sunshine laws on preventing public corruption).
3. For a discussion and numerous examples, see infra Section I.B.
4. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
[hereinafter FOIA] (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 522 (2012)) (requiring federal
agencies to maintain and disclose their records, subject to specific exemptions).
5. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (providing an exemption under FOIA for “trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential”); 100 Reporters L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 307 F.R.D. 269, 277 (D.D.C.
2014) (“[T]his court routinely has recognized that the submitter of documents to a
government agency has a cognizable interest in maintaining the confidentiality of those
documents . . . . ”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 975 F. Supp. 2d
81, 91–93 (D.D.C. 2013) (allowing Pfizer to intervene to challenge disclosure of reports
that the pharmaceutical company was required to submit to the Department of Health and
Human Services under settlement agreements of litigation over promoting off-label uses
of drugs).
6. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1804–05 (2002)
(providing three relevant definitions of “private”: [1a] “intended for or restricted to the
use of a particular person, group, or class <a private park>”; [1b] “belonging to or
concerning an individual person, company, or interest <a private house>”; [3b] “not
known or intended to be known publicly: secret”).
7. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] corporation is ‘an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ As such, it
is not entitled to ‘ “purely personal” guarantees’ whose ‘ “historic function” has been
limited to the protection of individuals.’ Thus, a corporation has no . . . right to privacy.”
(internal ellipses and citations omitted)); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy.”); Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The
District Court correctly found that, as an entity, Baker ‘clearly had no privacy
interest’ . . . .” (internal brackets omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters., Inc. v. NDC of Cal.,
L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[B]usiness
entities do not have a right to privacy.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691
N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (“Cases from other jurisdictions unanimously deny a right of
privacy to corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 1977) (“A corporation as such has no right to privacy.”); cf. RESTATEMENT OF
DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES § 2(1)–(2) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, Oct. 24,
2014) (focusing on privacy protections for personal information, defined as “any data that
refers to an identified person” and “singl[es] out . . . a specific individual from others”).
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focused on the issue of whether corporations should have the right to
common law or constitutional privacy.8 In contrast, this Article
illuminates how corporations enjoy plenty of privacy by other means
and addresses the question of how the secrecy that shields them
should be curtailed to protect the public.
Who needs the right to privacy enjoyed by ordinary natural
persons, when corporations can lock up information via property,
contract, and trade secret law?9 The challenge that courts, agencies,
legislatures, and citizens face is strong protection for private data that
sometimes keeps secret information that is important for protecting
the public.10 Examples of ongoing controversies include claiming
8. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights:
Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 626–38
(1987) (analyzing whether corporations should enjoy the protections of common law
privacy torts); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 84–
88 (2014) (discussing whether corporations should have a constitutional right to
information privacy); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
805, 815–17 (2005) (discussing the nonextension of Fifth Amendment protections to
businesses that receive subpoenas). By corporate privacy, this Article means protections
for corporations that affirmatively shield business information from disclosure. This is
different than privacy protections for consumer information that corporations must honor,
or material nonpublic information that securities laws require to be disclosed. See, e.g.,
Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1929 (2013) (using the term
corporate “privacy practices” to refer to how businesses use the consumer data they
amass); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817 (1980) (discussing required disclosures of material nonpublic
information under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5).
9. See infra notes 10–11 for examples and infra Part I for a discussion and more
examples; see also, e.g., KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 231 (1988) (“Although corporations have been held
to have no right of privacy, corporate actions in trade secrecy look very much like personal
actions in privacy for public disclosure of private facts.”).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (authorizing courts to prohibit discovery of
“a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information”);
Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1017–23 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the
confidentiality of sensitive commercial information overcame the presumption of
openness in discovery); Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that emissions information designated
as both “emission factors” and trade secrets by manufacturing company are not subject to
public release); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 724
N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (refusing to order disclosure by hazardous-waste landfill
operator of tracking information regarding processing and emissions of potentially
hazardous materials); 160 CONG. REC. S2912 (daily ed. May 12, 2014) (statement of Sen.
Sheldon Whitehouse) (“While confidentiality agreements can be useful tools to protect
sensitive information and trade secrets, too often they are used to hide important safety
concerns from regulators, policymakers, the news media, public health experts, and the
general public. Over the past 20 years, we have learned of numerous cases where courtapproved secrecy has shielded serious public health and safety dangers from the public—
putting hundreds, if not thousands of lives at risk. These cases have involved hydraulic
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trade secret protection against disclosing potentially hazardous
ingredients or emissions; creating secret settlements that hide deaths
linked to auto defects; or locking up drug counterfeiting information
as “proprietary data.”11
This Article discusses when and how the robust de facto privacy
that corporations enjoy should yield for public health or safety
reasons. The issue is of great legal import because litigants, concerned
citizens, and regulatory agencies often seek data and face a lack of
information access.12 Courts are divided over when to defer to
companies’ claims of the right to keep information private—even
when important public interests are implicated by the data that
companies refuse to disclose.13 The question is a very timely and live
fracturing, or ‘fracking,’ asbestos, defective auto components, and ‘adverse incidents’ from
drugs.”); see also infra Part I for a discussion and more examples, including pending
legislation.
11. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20
(nondisclosure of emissions information); 160 CONG. REC. S2912–13 (daily ed. May 12,
2014) (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse) (discussing how secret settlements have put
lives at risk); Robert Cockburn et al., The Global Threat of Counterfeit Drugs: Why
Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 2 PLOS MED. 0302, 0303–05
(2005) (discussing concerns over the refusal of pharmaceutical companies to release drug
counterfeiting investigation information under a claim that the data is proprietary); see
also infra Section I.B for more examples and discussion.
12. See, e.g., Conn. Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 P.3d 868, 874 (Cal. 2000)
(discussing a claim by corporate entities that subpoenas issued by city officials
investigating groundwater contamination with carcinogenic substances conflicted with
their privacy interests); Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. City of Richmond, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d
478, 490–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing refusal of Chevron to show the public or
decision makers proprietary data relied upon by its expert in evaluating refinery project
impact); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 715 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that information about allegedly defective product was “potentially
necessary” to plaintiffs alleging deaths due to defect but refusing to order disclosure due
to claim of trade secrets); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n, 320 P.3d 222, 234–35 (Wyo. 2014) (remanding for consideration of
whether information regarding the identity of chemicals used in fracking is a trade secret
not subject to disclosure); Opening Brief for Appellant General Motors Corp. at *15–16,
*21, Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 289 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 01-35126), 2001 WL
34095231 (arguing that General Motors settlement information is protected by the
confidentiality terms of the agreements); cf. Takeda Pharm., USA v. Burwell, Nos. 14-cv1668 (KBJ), 14-cv-1850 (KBJ), 2015 WL 252806, at *18 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2015) (arguing
against consideration of third-party proprietary data by the Food and Drug
Administration in fulfilling its duty to review the safety and effectiveness of marketed
drug products).
13. Compare, e.g., Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1017–25 (reversing the district court’s
decision to grant the Washington Post’s discovery requests to Mobil Oil Corp. on grounds
that the presumption of openness of discovery materials was overcome by Mobil Oil
Corp.’s privacy interests grounded in its interest in sensitive commercial information), and
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715 (holding that information on potentially
defective tires was not subject to disclosure even though “potentially necessary” to the
case of injured plaintiffs because of trade secret protections), and State ex rel. Lucas Cty.
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issue for Congress as well as the courts, with legislators introducing
various bills in recent years to cut back some forms of corporate
secrecy that conflict with public health and safety.14
While there are extensive financial disclosure laws for publicly
traded companies to ensure the financial wellbeing of the
marketplace and protect investors,15 there is no general law of
information access to facilitate the protection of public health and
safety. Because of the lack of information access, concerned citizens
and watchdog groups may have to sue to attempt to access
information through discovery.16 The Supreme Court’s decisions in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal17 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly18 have
heightened civil complaint pleading standards. This barrier-raising
makes it easier to dismiss cases even before discovery, thereby
Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20 (holding landfill operator’s data on waste
generators, relative amounts of waste generated, whether certain generators’ wastes failed
tests more often and whether a waste generator’s chemicals had to be mixed longer to be
properly treated for disposal were trade secrets that may not be disclosed), with Conn.
Indem. Co., 3 P.3d at 874 (declining to decide whether corporations have a privacy right
against disclosure of information to city officials investigating potential groundwater
contamination), and Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 235 (declining to decide
whether chemical ingredients used in fracking are trade secrets not subject to disclosure).
14. E.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (introduced May 20,
2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from restricting access to information “relevant to
the protection of public health or safety” by sealing such information in court records,
ordering nondisclosure of such information obtained in discovery, or approving such
restrictions in settlement agreements); Safety Over Secrecy Act of 2014, S. 2317, 113th
Cong. (introduced May 12, 2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from approving
confidential settlements that seal information relating to “protecting the public from a
hazard to public safety or health”); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, H.R. 4361, 113th
Cong. (introduced Apr. 1, 2014) (prescribing protections similar to S. 2364); Sunshine in
Litigation Act of 2011, H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (introduced Feb. 9, 2011) (prescribing
protections similar to S. 2364); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010, H.R. 5419, 111th Cong.
(introduced May 26, 2010) (similar); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th
Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 2009) (similar); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008, H.R. 5884,
110th Cong. (2008) (introduced Apr. 23, 2008) (similar).
15. E.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–77bbbb (2012)) (prescribing disclosure requirements for companies
engaged primarily in investing and trading in securities and whose own securities are
publicly offered); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 10, 48 Stat. 74, 81 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a, 77j (2012)) (prescribing required disclosures in prospectuses to investors);
Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–229, 249 (2014))
(discussing updates to financial disclosure requirements).
16. See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: The
Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 270, 278–79 (2007)
(discussing the use of pretrial discovery as a way for plaintiffs to investigate and get
information they need but otherwise cannot get presuit).
17. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
18. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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reducing the ability of even the extreme approach of lawsuits to reach
corporate information.19
This Article proposes bounded access to address the challenge of
unlocking legally shielded corporate data that directly impacts public
health, safety, and security.20 Bounded access gives professionals—
who are obligated by professional ethics to honor data use and
protection safeguards—the ability to view data that would otherwise
be locked away.21 The paradigmatic examples of such professionals
include attorneys, who are ethically bound to comply with court
orders, and researchers, who are ethically bound to comply with data
protections—and are even required to have Institutional Review
Board (“IRB”) approval before acquiring and using sensitive data.22
Such professionals can contribute expertise in detecting and
evaluating threats to public safety, thereby serving as a check to
ensure that dangers do not slip by government agencies, as well as
addressing public safety issues that fall outside the domain of any
regulatory agency at all.23
Bounded access remedies the limitations of the dominant
paradigm of disclosure to an information-pummeled consumer.24 The
general concern of mandated disclosure regimes is to correct the
imbalance in sophistication and information between the consumer

19. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10, 17–18, 50–52 (2010) (discussing
the major impact of Iqbal and Twombly in shifting the “center of gravity of federal
litigation . . . forward in time[,]”making the motion to dismiss of “potentially life-or-death
significance[,]” thus constituting “a continued retreat from the principles of citizen access,
private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of
corporate interests and concentrated wealth”); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery,
121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2325–32, 2338 (2012) (finding that Twombly and Iqbal have
prevented plaintiffs in at least 21.5% of cases facing a motion to dismiss from even
reaching discovery).
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975) (“We begin with the basic
proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly.”);
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. McCullough, 465
N.W.2d 878, 885 (Iowa 1991) (“[A] lawyer has a duty to obey a court order and a duty not
to advise a client to ignore it . . . . These principles are so obvious and basic that we should
not have to remind the bar of them.”); John A. Robertson, The Law of Institutional
Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 485–94 (1978) (discussing the rise of IRB
requirements for researchers and their institutions).
23. See infra Section III.A.
24. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not To
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 335–39 (2013) (discussing
disclosure regimes aimed at improving consumer decisions).

94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015)

168

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

and the company.25 Companies are required to inform consumers of
information relevant to smart decision-making—for example, that
cigarettes kill, that one has the right to inspect a house for lead-based
products before buying it, or that the effective mortgage rate is
actually higher than the advertised rate.26 The information is often no
secret; it is just not readily known to the humble, expertise-limited
consumer.27 And even if the information is well known to all, society
may want the facts to be conspicuous to the consumer at the point of
purchase.28
The challenge to access arises when information is made secret
by contract, trade secret, or property. Courts, regulatory agencies,
and disclosure laws tend to tiptoe around such claims of corporate

25. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 647, 705–09 (2011) (discussing the aim of correcting the information
imbalance between a company and the hypothetical “Chris Consumer”).
26. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 183–215 (2007) (analyzing examples of
eighteen disclosure regimes); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 653–71
(presenting numerous examples of disclosures, such as credit terms, contract boilerplate,
and health, insurance, financial, and other consumer disclosures).
27. Illinois, for example, requires lenders to provide the following notice before
making a high-risk home loan:
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO
OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER COST. YOU SHOULD SHOP
AROUND AND COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES. LOAN
RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY BASED ON
MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR PARTICULAR CREDIT
AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR EMPLOYMENT
HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE REQUESTED, AND THE
TYPE OF PROPERTY THAT WILL SECURE YOUR LOAN.
THE LOAN RATE AND FEES COULD ALSO VARY BASED
ON WHICH LENDER OR BROKER YOU SELECT. IF YOU
ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS LOAN, THE LENDER WILL
HAVE A MORTGAGE LIEN ON YOUR HOME . . . . YOU ARE
NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN AGREEMENT
MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS
DISCLOSURE OR HAVE SIGNED A LOAN APPLICATION.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/95 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Public Act 98-1174).
28. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (requiring all cigarettes to bear one of the following
disclosures: “WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive. WARNING: Tobacco smoke can
harm your children. WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease. WARNING:
Cigarettes cause cancer. WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease.
WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby. WARNING: Smoking can
kill you. WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.
WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health”); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2012) (requiring disclosure of interest rates and fees, including the
annual percentage rate, a standardized measure of the cost of obtaining credit).
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information secrecy rights, carving out exemptions from disclosure
requirements.29 Moreover, in some cases, courts have found general
public disclosure of health and safety information designated as trade
secrets to be a taking of property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.30
Instead of general disclosures to information-overloaded
consumers, bounded disclosure’s audience is expert professionals
obligated by the ethical rules of their field to comply with protections
for sensitive information.31 Bounded access would be permitted based
on a showing of both a need to detect or prevent public health, safety,
or security threats and a data-use plan with safeguards for sensitive
information.32 Such protected access addresses Fifth Amendment
takings claims.33 Bounded access also reduces the risk of prohibitive
resistance by companies concerned about revealing sensitive
proprietary data and suffering reputational damage from premature
consumer alarm.34 Bounded disclosure thus optimizes the utility of
disclosure so that the benefits are enhanced while the costs are
reduced.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses de facto
corporate privacy secured through contract, property, and trade
secret law, and how these protections can conflict with the need for
data to address public health and safety challenges. Three
contemporary controversies illustrate how the interests in private
data and public safety can conflict. The first example involves
claiming trade secret protection to avoid disclosure of potentially
hazardous ingredients or emissions.35 The second example is the
recurring controversy over secret settlements of suits involving
defects resulting in injuries or deaths.36 The third example involves

29. See examples cited supra notes 5, 10, and infra Section I.B.1.
30. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008–14 (2014); Philip Morris,
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 35–47 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc). For a discussion, see infra
Section I.B.1.
31. See infra Section III.A.
32. See infra Part III.
33. For a discussion, see infra Section III.A.
34. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Braeman, Overview of FOIA Administration in Government,
34 ADMIN. L. REV. 111, 113 (1982) (discussing the complexities of handling FOIA
requests for business records submitted to agencies because the companies submitting the
information “want[] the information protected at all costs” while the information-seeker
“wants the information released at all costs”).
35. See infra Section I.B.1.
36. See infra Section I.B.2.
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the refusal of pharmaceutical companies to disclose proprietary data
regarding the counterfeiting of their drugs.37
Part II discusses how the prevailing approach of mandated
general disclosure to consumers is insufficient to address the privatedata, public-safety conflict. In some cases, legislatures may face a
formidable Fifth Amendment takings clause issue in mandating
disclosure.38 Additionally, companies argue that general disclosures
risk prematurely alarming consumers and damaging brand
reputation.39 From the consumer’s perspective, such disclosures
merely pummel people already suffering from information overload
with another disclosure dump.40 Moreover, the typical general
consumer is not an expert at digesting data to detect risks and
formulate preventative measures, rendering disclosure an often
fruitless mandate.41
Part III proposes the bounded model of information access to
balance the public interest in access with safeguards for sensitive,
protected information. Such a model allows data access by experts
and motivated groups that can demonstrate good cause to pierce
corporate privacy to address important public health or safety
issues.42 Rather than piling more disclosures on the bewildered,
information-overloaded general consumer, bounded access is meant
for specialists such as researchers or lawyers who are ethically
obligated to comply with data use and protection safeguards and who
are better situated to use their expertise to detect potential threats to
public safety.43 Instead of what the Article terms “thin” information,
which is distilled down and rendered catchy to communicate
effectively to the individual consumer, bounded access uncovers
“thick information,” including technical detail necessary to permit
effective expert analysis.44 Bounded access also overcomes Fifth
Amendment takings claims that have bedeviled attempts to mandate
public disclosure of public health, safety, and environmental
information implicating trade secrets. Bounded access can thus
accommodate corporate privacy without allowing it to obscure or
trump the public interest in protecting population health, safety, and
security.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See infra Section I.B.3.
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.C.
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I. CORPORATE PRIVACY BY CONTRACT, PROPERTY, AND TRADE
SECRET LAW
Warren and Brandeis’s iconic article that launched the right to
privacy discussed how contract and property law stretched and
evolved to protect privacy before the formal designation of a right to
privacy.45 “Although the courts have asserted that they rested their
decisions on the narrow grounds of protection to property, there are
recognitions of a more liberal doctrine,” wrote Justices Brandeis and
Warren.46 In groping for protections, contract law also offered an
avenue: “[T]he courts, in searching for some principle upon which the
publication of private letters could be enjoined, naturally came upon
the ideas of a breach of confidence,” stretching the principles of
traditional contract law.47
Today, it is well settled that natural persons enjoy the right to
privacy as such, without need to stretch contract and property
concepts to protect private information.48 It is often said that, in
contrast to natural persons, companies do not have a right to
privacy.49 As the foundational article on the right to privacy
45. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 204–12 (1890); see also, Melvin B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 203 (1954) (discussing the influence of The Right to Privacy and calling the
article “perhaps the most famous and certainly the most influential law review article ever
written”).
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 204.
47. Id. at 211.
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A & cmts. a–d (AM. LAW.
INST. 1977) (recognizing the right to privacy); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 384–89 (1960) (collecting the large corpus of cases since the Warren and
Brandeis privacy article that cemented the formal right to privacy as such); Neil M.
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1887, 1891–95, 1903–07 (2010) (tracing the development and crystallization of privacy
law).
49. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] corporation is ‘an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ As such, it
is not entitled to ‘ “purely personal” guarantees’ whose ‘ “historic function” . . . has been
limited to the protection of individuals.’ Thus, a corporation has no . . . right to privacy.”)
(quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 536 (1819) and
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978)); United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”); Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477
F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The District Court correctly found that, as an entity, ‘Baker
clearly had no privacy interest.’ ” (internal brackets omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters. v.
NDC of Cal., L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10,
2011) (“[B]usiness entities do not have a right to privacy.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (“Cases from other jurisdictions
unanimously deny a right of privacy to corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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illuminated, however, we must look beyond formal designations to
see how the law protects the right against disclosure of information.
In reality, companies enjoy vigorous protections against
disclosure of embarrassing information. This Part begins by discussing
the main legal sources of such privacy by means other than
constitutional protection. The Part then illustrates the discussion with
examples of contemporary clashes between this forceful de facto
corporate privacy and the public interest in detecting and preventing
harm.
A. Who Needs the Common Person’s Privacy? Secrecy by Other
Means
Notwithstanding the formal absence of a corporate right to
privacy, companies seeking to keep data from being disclosed can
invoke claims grounded in property and contract, including trade
secret claims.50 These protections are so strong that even the rules
governing disclosure under sunshine laws or discovery in civil
litigation yield to them.51 For example, the Federal Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) exempts from disclosure “trade secrets
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.”52 In civil litigation, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(1)(G) allows parties facing discovery requests to
move for a protective order “to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,
TORTS § 652I cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“A corporation . . . has no personal right of
privacy.”).
50. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1029 (D.C. Cir.) (holding
that Mobil Oil Corp’s privacy interests in sensitive commercial information overcame the
presumption of openness in discovery and defeated the Washington Post’s discovery
requests in litigation), vacated on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170, 1017–25 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (per curiam); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709,
715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that information on potentially defective tires was not
subject to disclosure even though potentially necessary to the case of injured plaintiffs
because of trade secret protections); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (holding that trade secret
protection precluded disclosure of city landfill operator’s data on waste generators,
relative amounts of waste generated, whether certain generators’ wastes failed tests more
often, and whether a waste generator’s chemicals had to be mixed longer to be properly
treated for disposal).
51. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (exempting from FOIA requirements, “trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (authorizing courts to prohibit discovery of “a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information”);
MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (similar); MICH. CT. R. 2.302(c)(8) (similar); PA. R. CIV. P.
4012(a)(9) (similar).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
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including . . . requiring that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or
be revealed only in a specified way.”53 Numerous states have identical
or nearly identical provisions in their rules governing civil discovery.54
A trade secret is nonpublic information that is the subject of
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and that confers a business
advantage over competitors who lack that information.55 Such
information can include formulas, processes, technical know-how,
compilations of vital business information, and similar kinds of secret
knowledge.56 The aims of trade secret protection are to foster healthy
competition, reduce the need for companies to pursue extensive selfhelp security precautions, and encourage innovation.57
To be a trade secret, the information need not be novel or
original as with a patent or copyright, but it must be both kept secret
and valuable because it is secret.58 In contrast, the inventor of a
patentable material must disclose the art—the novel idea—to gain
protection because “the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring
new designs and technologies into the public domain through
disclosure.”59 Unlike patents, which are time limited, trade secrets
may indefinitely deprive the public of information.60
There is a vigorous debate over whether a trade secret is a form
of property.61 Traditionally, the central concern of trade secret
protection is the breach of a confidence by revelation of a secret.62 As
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
54. E.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280(c)(7); IOWA CT. R. 1.504(7); MASS R. CIV. P. 26(c);
MICH. CT. R. 2.302(c)(8); MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.03(g); MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(7); OHIO R.
CIV. P. 26(C); OR. R. CIV. P. 36(C)(7); PA. R. CIV. P. 4012(a)(9); WASH. CT. R. 26(c)(7).
55. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
56. Id.; see also, e.g., John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 5–6 (1962)
(listing and discussing examples and the broad swath of information that might constitute
trade secrets).
57. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974).
58. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); SCHEPPELE,
supra note 9, at 232–40.
59. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151–52 (1989).
60. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for a Trade Secret, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 648–50 (2013) (discussing how the perpetual nature of trade secrets and
the lack of requirement to disclose should lead companies to prefer trade secret over
patent protection).
61. See, e.g., SCHEPPELE, supra note 9, at 240 (“A number of cases have indicated that
it is breach of confidence, rather than any property theory, that underlies the decisions in
these cases.”); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1, 16 (2007) (“[T]he question of whether or not trade secrets are property has
raged on for many years.”).
62. See, e.g., DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
(Holmes, J.) (“Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows
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Justice Holmes wrote for the Supreme Court: “the starting point . . . is
not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiffs” and “fraudulently abuse[d]
the trust” by disclosure of a secret.63 Breach of confidence is a concept
that draws on principles of contract, tort, and privacy rather than
property.64 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that trade
secrets are a form of intangible property.65 Most states also accord
trade secrets property protection.66
The debate over the legal heritage of trade secrets is not just
academic. The issue has a practical impact in litigation. For example,
Monsanto Company argued all the way to the Supreme Court that
health and safety disclosures required under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act67 (“FIFRA”) would reveal trade
secrets and thereby constitute an unconstitutional governmental
taking of property.68 The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the data
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sought were trade
secrets and a form of intangible property implicating the Fifth
Amendment’s
protections
against
takings
without
just
69
compensation.
Regardless of whether information meets the requirements for
trade secrets, companies can also create and protect confidential
information by contract.70 Two main ways to create secrecy by

the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property
may be denied but the confidence cannot be.”); SCHEPPELE, supra note 9, at 240 (“[T]he
presence of a confidential relationship can be said to be at the heart of the protection of
trade secrets.”).
63. Masland, 244 U.S. at 102.
64. See, e.g., Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,
1226–27 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the tort of breach of confidence “based upon the
concept of an implied obligation or contract between the parties that confidential
information will not be disclosed”); Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 641 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“[W]hile contract theories may have contributed to the development of the
breach-of-confidence cause of action, it owes its existence to several doctrines, including
the right to privacy.”).
65. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding that
health and safety data are implicated by trade secret protections and that trade secrets are
a form of intangible property).
66. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“In most
states, trade secrets are property protected by the Takings Clause.”).
67. Pub. L. No. 98-201, 97 Stat. 1379 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2012)).
68. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 992–93, 998–99, 1003–04.
69. Id. at 1004. Section I.B.1 will further delve into the complexities of Ruckelshaus
and the Fifth Amendment implications of trade secret disclosure provisions.
70. See, e.g., Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under
Georgia Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 624 (1985) (“Complementing trade secrets,
‘confidential information’ in Georgia may include almost any other business information
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contract include nondisclosure agreements and settlement
agreements with nondisclosure provisions.71 The legal protection of
corporate information comes through enforcement of the contract.72
Nondisclosure contracts are often used with employees, licensees,
prospective purchasers, and other companies.73 Such agreements are
more likely to be time limited because of prohibitions against
unreasonable restraints of trade and employment that consider how
long people are prohibited from using their know-how.74
In contrast, nondisclosure provisions in secret settlements with
injured plaintiffs may lack any time limit.75 One example of a
confidentiality clause provides that the parties:
[E]xpressly understand and agree that this Agreement and its
contents (including, but not limited to, the fact of payment and
the amounts to be paid hereunder) shall remain
CONFIDENTIAL and shall not be disclosed to any third party
whatsoever, except the Parties’ counsel, accountants, financial
advisors, tax professionals retained by them, any federal, state,
or local governmental taxing or regulatory authority, and the
Parties’ management, officers and Board of Directors, and
except as required by law or order of court. Any person
identified in the preceding sentence to whom information
concerning this Agreement is disclosed is bound by this

of importance, but legal protection of confidential information occurs only through
enforcement of the express terms of a contractual relationship or, less frequently, the
implied terms of a confidential relationship.”); Linda K. Stevens, When Should a
Confidentiality Agreement Contain a Time Limit?, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 4 (1999)
(discussing how confidentiality agreements can protect information otherwise not entitled
to trade secret protection).
71. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM.
BUS. L.J. 151, 152–53 (1998); Quittmeyer, supra note 70, at 665; Stevens, supra note 70, at
3–4.
72. Quittmeyer, supra note 70, at 665–66.
73. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 301 (1998).
74. See, e.g., Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 218 S.E.2d 68, 70 (Ga. 1975) (holding that a
perpetual nondisclosure agreement is so broad as to be unreasonable); Gary Van Zeeland
Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 267 N.W.2d 242, 248–50 (Wis. 1978) (similar); Stevens, supra note
70, at 4 (advising lawyers to include a time limit in their nondisclosure agreements to avoid
problems).
75. Examples of actual secret settlement confidentiality provisions are, for obvious
reasons, not publicly available. However, model clauses are instructive. See, e.g., LITIG.
SOLS. LAW GRP., A SAMPLER OF CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES FOR INCLUSION IN
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, http://lslg.com/pdfs/A%20Sampler%20of%20Confidentialit
y%20Clauses_020510.pdf (last modified Feb. 2, 2010) [http://perma.cc/Q8DJ-4J9X].
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confidentiality provision and the disclosing party shall be liable
for any breaches of confidentiality . . . . 76
In securing settlements, plaintiffs face powerful pressure to accede to
blanket secrecy provisions that require silence not only about the
settlement terms but also the facts of the case.77
The current rules of discovery in litigation and by the public
through sunshine laws accommodate this manufactured de facto
corporate privacy.78 Federal FOIA and most similar state sunshine
laws flatly exempt “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential[.]”79 Notwithstanding the reference to a “person” in the
provision, the exemption covers information submitted by a wide
range of entities, including companies.80 By executive order,
businesses that submit information to federal agencies may claim
exemption from disclosure by designating such information
“confidential commercial information” and stating that “disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause substantial competitive
harm.”81 When someone submits a request for such information to the
government, the owner of the information is entitled to notice to
defend against release.82
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(G) and similar state
rules are permissive in the sense that they give courts discretion to

76. JEREMY A. MERCER & EVAN A. BLOCH, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
RELEASE: A U.S. EXAMPLE 4 (2012), http://www.pepperlaw.com/uploads/files/bloche
_settlementagreementandrelease_ausexample_2_503_1929.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4LN6QMU].
77. See id.
78. See discussion supra notes 50–54.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002 (LEXIS
through 80 Del. Laws, Ch. 193) (stating that “[t]rade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person which is of a privileged or confidential nature” is not
a public record subject to disclosure); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 6121-1-18(C)(4) (West,
Westlaw through Sept. 30, 2015) (noting that “confidential trade secrets or other
confidential material . . . are . . . not subject to disclosure to the public”); Theresa M.
Costonis, Annotation, What Constitutes Commercial or Financial Information, Exclusive of
Trade Secrets, Exempt from Disclosure Under State Freedom of Information Acts—
General Rules of Construction, 5 A.L.R. 6th 327 (2005) (“Virtually all states have an
information act and most have an exemption thereto applicable to commercial or financial
information.”).
80. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (“ ‘[P]erson’ includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.”); FCC v.
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (noting that the provision “clearly applies to
corporations”).
81. Exec. Order No. 12,600, 3 C.F.R. 235, 236 (1987–1988).
82. Id. at 237–38.
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issue a protective order rather than command that such orders issue.83
The discovery rules are tilted toward preventing embarrassment by
disclosure, however, by specifying that preventing “embarrassment”
is a basis to grant a protective order—and not specifying that the need
to detect and prevent threats to public health or safety is a
countervailing reason not to grant requests.84 As discussed in the next
section, companies have successfully claimed these accommodations
for corporate privacy, locking up information relevant for detecting
and addressing public health and safety concerns.
B.

Three Contemporary Controversies over Corporate Secrecy and
Public Health and Safety

A major aim of protections against disclosure of corporate trade
secrets or confidential information is to reduce the risk of
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”85 Implicit in these goals is the reduction of unwarranted
embarrassment and other costs—though not all embarrassment or
other costs—that are inherent in the discovery process.86 The
challenge is determining how and where to strike the balance when
the public benefit outweighs the costs and imposition upon private
interests. As discussed below, controversies have flared when
companies wield robust protections for corporate privacy to ward off
attempts to investigate potential public health and safety concerns.
Sometimes
the
disclosure
battle
is
over
whether
nongovernmental actors may have access to information required by
law to be reported to governmental agencies.87 Sometimes the battle
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (stating courts “may, for good cause,” issue such an
order).
84. Id. (stating courts may “issue an order to protect a party or person
from . . . embarrassment”). This omission contrasts with more progressive state provisions
such as California Evidence Code section 1060, which provides that “the owner of a trade
secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from
disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (West, Westlaw through ch. 807 of 2015 Reg.
Sess. & Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 2d Ex. Sess.).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., Knoettgen v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(“In all forms of discovery . . . witnesses are afforded statutory protection from
unwarranted intrusiveness, annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression.” (emphasis
added)).
87. See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Cty. of Mendocino Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 639, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a company’s objection to public
disclosure of information regarding air emissions “factors” required to be reported to
county air management regulators); State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ohio Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 724 N.E.2d 411, 417–20 (Ohio 2000) (refusing to order public disclosure of
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is over whether a corporation has to disclose such information to
government regulators.88 And sometimes the battle is over mandated
disclosure directly to consumers.89 Three contemporary controversies
illustrate this clash: nondisclosure of potentially hazardous or toxic
product components, secret settlements, and nondisclosure of drug
counterfeiting information.
1. Privacy by Trade Secret: Hiding Potential Hazards
Companies fighting against having to disclose information about
potentially hazardous ingredients, product defects, toxic emissions,
and other potential public harms frequently claim that the
information sought is a trade secret.90 For example, when
Bridgestone/Firestone Tire Company faced lawsuits across the
country for deaths due to separating tires leading to car crashes, the
company successfully used claims of trade secret to ward off attempts
to obtain discovery of the rubber formula used in the tires.91 Though
the formula was relevant to the case brought by bereaved relatives
and crash survivors, courts refused to allow its discovery, holding that,
data submitted by hazardous-waste landfill operator to state environmental protection
agency).
88. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998–99, 1003–04 (1984)
(considering claim that disclosures required under federal law to the EPA would reveal
trade secrets and violate the takings clause); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 26,
28–31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (invalidating a Massachusetts law requiring disclosure of
ingredient lists for all cigarette, snuff, and chewing tobacco products sold in the state and
allowing for disclosure of such information whenever disclosure “could reduce risks to
public health”); Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. v. FTC, 496 F. Supp. 838, 845 (N.D. Ind. 1980)
(considering claim by corporation that disclosure to state law enforcement agency would
constitute a Fifth Amendment taking of a trade secret).
89. See, e.g., Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 149–50 (1st Cir.
2012) (considering claim by trust that a state law requiring health insurers to disclose
aggregate loss information would reveal a trade secret and be an uncompensated taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–
06 (1st Cir. 2005) (arguing that statute mandating that pharmaceutical companies disclose
to customers information regarding discounts and other contract terms requires
disclosures of trade secrets and constitutes a regulatory taking without just compensation).
90. E.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–06; Cioppa, 695 F.3d at 149; Pharm. Care
Mgmt. Ass’n, 429 F.3d at 305–06; Philip Morris, Inc., 312 F.3d at 28–31; Masonite Corp., 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648; Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 193
(Ind. 2007); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So.2d 1057, 1061 (Miss. 1987); State ex rel.
Lucas Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 724 N.E.2d at 417–20; Crum v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am.
Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d
609, 612 (Tex. 1998).
91. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 715 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196–97; Crum, 907 A.2d at 588. For a history of the
Bridgestone Tire controversy and the pattern of deaths hidden for years while deaths
continued to accumulate, see Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects Were Known in ‘96 but
Not Reported, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at A1.
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to access the information, the plaintiffs had to meet the high burden
of showing that it was necessary to prove their case.92
The solicitude for trade secrets was so strong that it even
trumped the interest of crash survivors in the more progressive
jurisdiction of California.93 California law limits protection of trade
secrets in discovery only where it “will not tend to . . . work
injustice.”94 The California Court of Appeals ruled that preventing
discovery of a trade secret “may not be deemed to ‘work
injustice’ . . . simply because it would protect information generally
relevant to the subject matter of an action or helpful to preparation of
a case.”95 Rather, like courts in other jurisdictions, the California
court required the person seeking the evidence to make a prima facie
case that “the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of
the lawsuit” and “necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a
material element” of the cause of action.96 Even though the accident
survivors in the case submitted an expert declaration that the
chemical recipe for the tire would help them determine why the tire
failed, the court found this need insufficient to meet the high bar.97
The court reasoned that the expert did not specify how the formulas
were necessary for him to reach conclusions and noted that, in
another case, he drew conclusions without access to formula
information.98
Even where the law requires disclosure, companies have raised
Fifth Amendment takings clause challenges against it.99 The landmark
case in this area is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co.100 Ruckelshaus concerned the constitutionality of
disclosures of health, safety, and environmental data submitted to the
EPA by companies seeking to register pesticide products for sale.101

92. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716; Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196–
97; Crum, 907 A.2d at 588.
93. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715.
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 807 of 2015 Reg. Sess. &
Ch. 1 of 2d Ex. Sess.).
95. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
96. Id. at 713.
97. Id. at 716.
98. Id.
99. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–06 (1984); Me. Educ. Ass’n
Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 148 (1st. Cir 2012); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v.
Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2005); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 28–31
(1st Cir. 2002); id. at 48, 51 (Selya, J., concurring).
100. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
101. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000–01.
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To understand the complex holding of the case, it is important to
understand its statutory context. The statutory regime at issue was
FIFRA.102 Before amendments in 1972, FIFRA did not have
provisions regarding the authorized use and disclosure of data
submitted by pesticide companies in connection with their product
registrations.103 In 1972, however, Congress amended FIFRA.104 The
1972 amendments added a new provision governing public disclosure
of data, including a provision that prohibited the EPA from publicly
disclosing data that related to “trade secrets or commercial or
financial information[.]”105 Heavy litigation followed over several
provisions left unclear after the 1972 amendments.106 In 1978,
Congress enacted new legislation, again amending FIFRA, including
revisions to the data disclosure provisions.107 The 1978 amendment
added a new provision requiring disclosure of all health, safety, and
environmental data even if the company claimed the information was
a trade secret.108
Chemical and agricultural products company Monsanto sued,
challenging the provision requiring disclosure of health, safety, and
environmental data.109 The Supreme Court ruled that a trade secret is
a form of intangible property protected by the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment.110 The more complex question was whether
disclosure of the data constituted a taking.111
Generally, analysis of whether a taking has occurred is fact
dependent and ad hoc.112 A court examines the question of whether
regulation has gone too far and become a taking in light of several
factors, including “the character of the governmental action, its
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment102. Id. at 990 (construing Pub. L. No. 98-201, 97 Stat. 1379 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 136 (2012)).
103. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1008.
104. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat.
973 (1972).
105. Id. § 10(b), 86 Stat. at 989.
106. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 993–95.
107. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 136(h)(d) (2012)).
108. Id. § 15(2)(d)(1) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (1982)). The provision has been
amended yet again and no longer allows for disclosure of health, safety, and
environmental data to qualified requesters notwithstanding claims of trade secrets as it did
under the 1978 amendment. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat.
819 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d) (2012)).
109. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998.
110. Id. at 1003–04.
111. Id. at 1004.
112. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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backed expectations.”113 Thus, interference with investment-backed
expectations—beyond mere impingement on a “unilateral
expectation or an abstract need”—is one of several factors weighing
in favor of finding a taking.114
Rather than examining all the factors, however, the Ruckelshaus
Court found that just one factor—reasonable investment-backed
expectations—was “so overwhelming” that it was dispositive.115 The
Court held that between 1972 and 1978, when FIFRA expressly
forbade disclosure of trade secrets, Monsanto had a reasonable
investment-backed expectation of nondisclosure predicated on that
explicit statutory assurance.116 Monsanto could therefore claim a
taking if the EPA then publicly disclosed the information, upsetting
Monsanto’s expectations of continuing control and power to exclude
others from knowledge of the data.117
In contrast, the Court ruled that after 1978, when FIFRA was
amended to announce that health, safety, and environmental
information was subject to public disclosure, Monsanto could have no
reasonable investment-backed expectation of confidentiality.118 While
it is true that disclosure was the price of registration of a pesticide,
“such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange for
‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community.’ ”119 Even before 1972, when FIFRA was simply silent
about disclosure, Monsanto had no reasonable expectation of
confidentiality.120 As a company in an industry that “long has been the
focus of great public concern and significant government regulation,”
it was likely that the government would find disclosure to be in the
public interest.121
While Ruckelshaus seemed to have struck a balance, allowing
public disclosure where a regulatory law gives notice and dispels
investment-backed expectations of confidentiality, the lower courts
continue to wrestle with takings clause challenges to disclosure
laws.122 The First Circuit’s en banc decision in Philip Morris, Inc. v.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
Pharm.

PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005–06.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1007 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)).
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1009.
See, e.g., Me. Educ. Ass’n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa, 695 F.3d 145, 148 (1st Cir. 2012);
Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305–06 (1st Cir. 2005); Philip Morris,

94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015)

182

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Reilly123 illustrates how strong protections for trade secrets still
remain notwithstanding Ruckelshaus.124 At issue in Philip Morris was
the 1996 Massachusetts Disclosure Act, which was enacted out of
concern that some tobacco product additives worsened health
consequences and potentially increased nicotine delivery in cigarettes
marketed as low nicotine.125 Without knowing the identity of tobacco
product additives, it was hard to investigate the adverse health
consequences of product interactions or study the impact of additives
popular in products marketed to younger consumers.126 The law also
aimed to publicize the ingredient lists of various brands to raise public
awareness about additives and inform consumer choice.127
Philip Morris sued, alleging that the ingredients in tobacco
products are trade secrets and that public disclosure constituted a
taking without just compensation.128 Writing for the en banc court,
Judge Torruella proceeded to painstakingly analyze each of the
myriad factors governing when a regulation becomes a taking rather
than viewing the investment-backed expectation factor as dispositive,
as the Supreme Court did in Ruckelshaus.129 The decision drew on the
Supreme Court’s multi-factor test in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City,130 weighing (1) the economic impact of the
regulation, (2) the interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action.131
Even though there was no express promise of confidentiality in
the law, and tobacco is a heavily regulated product, the Philip Morris
court nonetheless found that the Massachusetts public health law
interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations and
constituted an impermissible taking.132 The court narrowly
distinguished Ruckelshaus, explaining that it dealt with property
interests in data already submitted to the EPA whereas Philip Morris
was refusing to submit data altogether.133 The effect of Philip Morris
is that once a company complies with a data submission requirement
Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 26, 28–31 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc); Bridgestone Ams. Holding,
Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ind. 2007).
123. 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
124. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28–31, 47.
125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996); Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28.
126. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 28.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id. at 35–47; see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
130. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
132. Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 45–46.
133. Id. at 38.
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and gives information to the government it has less ability to
challenge public disclosure, whereas a company that challenges a law
at the outset and refuses to disclose data to the government has a
much greater chance of prevailing.134
The Philip Morris decision swept even more broadly than just
cabining Ruckelshaus’s reasoning regarding investment-backed
expectations. In addition, the Philip Morris court ruled that the
Disclosure Act “essentially destroys the tobacco companies’ trade
secrets” and rendered the economic impact of the regulation
potentially dispositive.135 Even more sweepingly, the decision
indicated that legislatures seeking to protect public health through
disclosure regulations must “show more than a possible beneficial
effect.”136 The Philip Morris court cited less intrusive regulatory
regimes and concluded that legislatures must demonstrate that
proposed public health disclosure regimes “further the stated goal of
promoting public health in such a way as to counterbalance the
tremendous private loss involved.”137 Philip Morris thus illustrates
that corporate privacy through trade secret protection remains
vigorously alive and well in the lower courts after Ruckelshaus, posing
a roadblock to general public disclosure statutes meant to protect
health and safety.
2. Privacy by Contract: Secret Settlements
Another powerful way to hide embarrassing information of
public import is through secret settlements—a recurring controversy
that tends to erupt into public view belatedly, following rising victim
counts.138 A settlement is essentially a private contract with provisions
enforced by courts.139 Settlement of lawsuits for injuries due to
product defects, toxic emissions, or other public health and safety
issues using agreements with nondisclosure provisions essentially

134. See id. at 50 (Selya, J., concurring) (“After all a secret remains a secret when not
divulged.”).
135. Id. at 42 (majority opinion).
136. Id. at 44.
137. Id. at 45.
138. See, e.g., Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of
Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 433–
35 (2005) (citing numerous examples such as the Catholic Church’s sex-abuse scandal,
litigation over the Ford Pinto, infertility, deaths due to use of the Dalkon Shield (an
intrauterine device, or IUD) and more).
139. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)
(discussing methods to enforce contractual terms in settlement agreements).
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creates corporate privacy by contract.140 Because casualties are
concealed by settlement contracts, death and injury counts may rise
unchecked until the problem becomes too big to hide, erupting into
national attention. A recent example is the scandal over the use of
secret settlements by General Motors to conceal from the public
deaths due to ignition switch defects in several models of its cars.141
To put the General Motors scandal into its legal and historical
context, it is helpful to have a brief history of the Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act
(“TREAD Act”).142 The TREAD Act was birthed in tragedy: the
deaths of 271 people and injuries of more than 700 others in accidents
involving Ford Explorer SUVs with defective Bridgestone/Firestone
tires that suffered tread separation, causing the SUVs to roll over.143
Congress acted in response to public outrage over Ford Motor
Company and Bridgestone/Firestone’s failure to report to the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
numerous lawsuits involving deaths or serious injuries due to

140. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on Secret
Settlements Does More Harm than Good, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at D4 (“Secret
settlements allow both parties to get on with their lives by preserving privacy interests.”).
141. Paul M. Barrett, The GM Fiasco and Overuse of Secret Settlements: Four Blunt
Points, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com
/articles/2014-06-25/the-gm-fiasco-and-the-overuse-of-secret-settlements-four-blunt-points
[http://perma.cc/5GQ9-9GM5] (discussing the controversy over General Motors’ alleged
“past policy of secretly settling lawsuits that could have brought defects to public attention
years before the massive recalls of recent months”); Editorial, Sealed Settlements Could
Kill: Our View, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/2014/03/10/sealed-settlements-general-motors-priests-bridgestone-firestoneeditorials-debates/6270853/ [http://perma.cc/WXM6-UJWP] (detailing controversy over
the sealed settlement of a case alleging death due to a General Motors ignition-switch
defect—nine years before the company finally issued a recall after thirteen deaths
allegedly due to the defective ignition switches in Chevrolet Cobalt cars); Rep. Nadler
Introduces Bill To Stop Companies, Like GM, from Hiding Safety Flaws, CONGRESSMAN
JERROLD NADLER (Apr. 1, 2014), http://nadler.house.gov/press-release/rep-nadlerintroduces-bill-stop-companies-gm-hiding-safety-flaws [hereinafter Nadler Press Release]
[http://perma.cc/TJX8-QJ35] (discussing proposed legislation, termed the Sunshine in
Litigation Act, to “prevent companies . . . from concealing evidence of wrongdoing that
puts our public health and safety at risk” by using confidential settlements “to keep
lifesaving information from the public”).
142. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 6–7 (2000) (discussing background and need for
legislation).
143. See id.; Kevin M. McDonald, Don’t TREAD on Me: Faster than a Tire Blowout,
Congress Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation that Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1163, 1171–79 (2001) (detailing the controversy
leading to the legislation).
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defective tires and that the company had recalled its products
overseas due to crash findings.144
Moreover, for four years, companies and plaintiffs’ attorneys
negotiating settlements had kept secret information about a pattern
of tire failures and consumer deaths and injuries in order to negotiate
a settlement.145 It took a Houston television station’s report on the
deaths and serious injuries to alert the public.146 Congressional
hearings brought even more information to light, including that—
contrary to the public’s assumption that SUVs were safer—SUVs
were actually more likely to roll over, with some models at
particularly high risk.147 Like the information about the tire-defectrelated crashes, the information about which SUV models were
particularly dangerous was locked away in confidential company
files.148
The TREAD Act included detailed disclosure requirements to
NHTSA in hopes of unlocking files containing important public
health and safety information.149 Vehicle manufacturers must report
to the government all motor vehicle defects and all incidents of
serious or fatal crashes linked to a vehicle defect for which the
manufacturer has received notice.150 The reporting requirements are
intended to enable more effective government safety surveillance and
timely recalls.151 The reporting requirements are also backed by civil
penalties for failure to report and criminal liability for intentional
misreporting.152
The luster of the TREAD Act’s surveillance system was
damaged after revelations of NHTSA inaction despite reports of a
potential ignition switch defect in Chevrolet Cobalts and Saturn Ions
manufactured by General Motors.153 The defect, which caused an
engine and electrical system shut-off and disabled vehicle air bags,
144. McDonald, supra note 143, at 1163, 1171–79.
145. Bradsher, supra note 91, at A1.
146. FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at 1–2.
147. Id. at 2.
148. Id.
149. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166(e)–(m) (2012).
150. Id. § 30166(m).
151. See McDonald, supra note 143, at 1185–86.
152. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30165(a), 30170(a)(1) (2012).
153. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, STAFF REPORT ON
THE GM IGNITION SWITCH RECALL: REVIEW OF NHTSA, at 1–2 (2014),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Heari
ngs/OI/20140915GMFootnotes/NHTSAreportfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZ2E-P3Q2]
[hereinafter REVIEW OF NHTSA]; Christopher Jensen, In G.M. Recalls, Inaction and Trail
of Fatal Crashes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, at B1.
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was linked to at least 35 and allegedly as many as 153 deaths.154 It was
not until 2014 that General Motors issued a recall amid controversy
over why the company and NHTSA had not acted sooner.155
The controversy and delay in the public being alerted also has reignited concern over “secret settlements” in which claimants alleging
injury or death due to defects are paid in settlements placed under
protective order to prevent disclosure.156 The public outcry has
prompted the reintroduction of legislation to curb settlement secrecy
in cases involving issues of public health or safety.157 The proposed
legislation would forbid courts from entering protective orders or
approving settlement agreements that would restrict disclosure of
information “relevant to the protection of public health or safety.”158
The most recently introduced version of the bill contains an exception
where “the public interest in the disclosure of past, present, or
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and
substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
information or records in question” and the protection “is no broader
than necessary to protect the confidentiality interest asserted.”159 As
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the sponsor of one of the bills, explained, the
legislation is aimed at “prevent[ing] companies . . . from concealing
evidence of wrongdoing that puts our public health and safety at risk”

154. Tribune Staff, Death Toll Rises to 35 in Faulty GM Ignition Switch Claims, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/chigm-ignition-switch-deaths-20141124-story.html [http://perma.cc/8FNG-AMWN]; Jensen,
supra note 153, at B1; Ben Klayman, Deaths Linked to GM Ignition-Switch Defect Rise to
23, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-gmrecall-compensation-idUSKCN0HO1F220140929 [http://perma.cc/752G-4QUQ] (stating
that 153 death claims had been reported).
155. REVIEW OF NHTSA, supra note 153, at 1–2; Jensen, supra note 153, at B1.
156. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 141 (discussing General Motors controversy);
Editorial, Secrecy that Kills, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at SR10 (detailing congressional
investigation into the General Motors scandal).
157. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (introduced May 20,
2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from restricting access to information “relevant to
the protection of public health or safety” by sealing such information in court records,
ordering nondisclosure of such information obtained in discovery, or approving such
restrictions in settlement agreements); Safety Over Secrecy Act of 2014, S. 2317, 113th
Cong. (introduced May 12, 2014) (endeavoring to prohibit courts from approving
confidential settlements that seal information relating to “protecting the public from a
hazard to public safety or health”); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, H.R. 4361, 113th
Cong. (introduced Apr. 1, 2014) (prescribing protections similar to Senate Bill 2364).
158. S. 2364 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1); H.R. 4361 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1); see also S. 2317 sec. 2, §
1660(b)(1)(A) (slightly different language).
159. S. 2364 sec. 2, § 1660(a)(1)(B).
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by using confidential settlements “to keep lifesaving information from
the public.”160
While the General Motors scandal has given the settlement
sunshine legislation new momentum, the legislation is likely to face
the same powerful opposition that killed prior such legislation in
2008,161 2009,162 2010,163 and 2011.164 In 2011, similar legislation
emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee with bipartisan
support—only to die under intense fire from the business community
concerned about the consequences of public disclosure of such
settlements.165 Absent such legislative intervention, the creation of
secrecy by contract remains unchecked.
3. Privacy by “Proprietary Data”: Counterfeit Drugs
Claiming that data are “proprietary” is a third way to create
corporate privacy. As a case study of this approach, consider the case
of counterfeit drugs. Dubbed “medicrime” for short,166 the social costs
of counterfeiting drugs or creating poor-quality substitutes go beyond
intellectual property offenses. People have died after ingesting
contaminated counterfeit medicines or from taking what they thought
were prophylactic or treatment drugs that were actually fakes, leaving
them unprotected or untreated.167 Hospitalization and deaths have
160. Nadler Press Release, supra note 141.
161. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008, H.R. 5884, 110th Cong. (introduced Apr. 23,
2008).
162. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th Cong. (introduced Mar. 12,
2009).
163. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010, H.R. 5419, 111th Cong. (introduced May 26,
2010).
164. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011, H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (introduced Feb. 9,
2011).
165. See Barrett, supra note 141.
166. See Council of Europe, Convention on the Counterfeiting of Medical Products
and Similar Crimes Involving Threats to Public Health, opened for signature Oct. 28, 2011,
C.E.T.S. No. 211 [hereinafter MEDICRIME Convention] (calling for signatories to
criminalize drug counterfeiting and related public health crimes).
167. See, e.g., Kristina M. Lybecker, Rx Roulette: Combatting Counterfeit
Pharmaceuticals in Developing Nations, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 509, 510
(2007) (summarizing infamous cases, such as the deaths of more than 2,500 people
vaccinated with counterfeit anti-meningitis drugs during a meningitis outbreak); Paul N.
Newton et al., Manslaughter by Fake Artesunate in Asia—Will Africa Be Next?, 3 PLOS
MED. e197, 0752–55 (2006) (discussing problems with counterfeit anti-malarial drugs
plaguing Asia and a case of a death due to treatment with counterfeit drugs); Rachel
Ehrenberg, Counterfeit Crackdown: New Scientific Tools Help Tell Fake Meds from the
Real Thing, SCI. NEWS, June 18, 2011, at 22–24 (discussing how more than fifty Nigerian
children died after taking contaminated counterfeit teething medicine and the death of a
twenty-two-year-old Argentinian woman after receiving an injection of counterfeit iron);
Lindsay Kines, Counterfeit Pills Kill B.C. Woman; Internet Site Linked to Death: Coroner,
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even ensued from seemingly less serious counterfeiting of pleasureenhancing drugs taken for erectile dysfunction, such as Cialis.168
Because law enforcement resources to combat the spread of
counterfeit medicines are stretched thin or missing in the areas of
greatest risk, private actors, particularly major drug companies, play
critical investigative and enforcement roles.169 Pharmaceutical
companies use private investigators to detect and try to shut down
counterfeiting enterprises.170 Recognizing the need to have the
expertise of major drug companies in investigating and securing
prosecution of counterfeiters, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) even gave large pharmaceutical companies seats on its
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, the
largest anti-counterfeiting working group, despite outcry from smaller
generic manufacturers.171 In addition, the security departments of
twenty-five major pharmaceutical companies run the nonprofit
Pharmaceutical Security Institute and its private, secure database
containing member reports of fake drugs and packaging.172
The pharmaceutical companies view the database as proprietary
and confidential and do not release the information to researchers—
and perhaps not even to the WHO or other intergovernmental or
governmental organizations.173 Without access to the databases,
researchers are unable to identify and study drugs vulnerable to
counterfeiting. While private companies certainly have an interest in
shutting down entities they view as counterfeiters, this is
counterbalanced against their interest in keeping matters quiet so that
the public is not alerted and does not lose trust in the brand.174 The

EDMONTON J., July 6, 2007, at A5 (reporting on the death of a fifty-eight-year-old woman
who died from a toxic overload of metals after ingesting counterfeit pills she bought
online).
168. Neil Campbell et al., Internet-Ordered Viagra (Sildenal Citrate) Is Rarely Genuine,
9 J. SEXUAL MED. 2943, 2947 (2012) (discussing findings regarding counterfeit Viagra);
Shih Ling Kao et al., Letter to the Editor, An Unusual Outbreak of Hypoglycemia, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 734, 734–35 (2009).
169. INST. OF MED., COUNTERING THE PROBLEM OF FALSIFIED AND SUBSTANDARD
DRUGS 16 (Gilliam J. Buckley & Lawrence O. Gostin eds., 2013); Cockburn et al., supra
note 11, at 0303.
170. Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303.
171. See INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 16.
172. Id. at 86–87.
173. Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303–05. Cockburn et al. questioned the
database keepers about release of information to the WHO and governmental authorities
but did not receive a direct answer beyond a reiteration that the information is proprietary
and confidential. Id.
174. Id. at 0303.
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secrecy impedes the ability to conduct independent checks and
scrutiny.
Concern over the adulteration of medicines has existed as long as
medicinal use.175 Harmful medicines exist because of a range of
misconduct, from passing off a drug as made by another
manufacturer, to adulterating medicines, to a combination of these
misbehaviors or otherwise producing substandard drugs.176 One
common distinction in usage today is between counterfeit drugs—
referring to drugs falsified as to source, identity, or both—and
substandard drugs that fail to meet specifications, for example, by
having the wrong concentration of active ingredients.177 The problem
is intensifying in modern times, however, because of the ease of mass
manufacturing knock-offs, globalization of supply chains, and the rise
of Internet pharmacies.178
While the regions hardest hit by the use problems also tend to be
in developing parts of the world, the problem is not just a poorcountry or developing-world issue.179 With the rise of global trade,
Internet pharmacies, and the lucrative nature of producing fake or
substandard drugs for sale, officials in countries like the United
States, Canada, Britain, and other European Union nations are
expressing concern.180 Counterfeit Viagra, Ritalin, antibiotics, and
other drugs have been in circulation in the United States.181

175. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTERFEIT DRUGS: GUIDELINES FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES TO COMBAT COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 11 (1999).
176. INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 1–2 (noting the problem is “vastly aggravated by
modern manufacturing and trade” and international supply chains). WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 175, at 11.
177. See, e.g., J.-M. Caudron et al., Substandard Medicines in Resource-Poor Settings: A
Problem that Can No Longer Be Ignored, 13 TROPICAL MED. & INT’L HEALTH 1062, 1063
(2008) (using the distinction).
178. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 1–2 (noting the problem is “vastly
aggravated by modern manufacturing and trade” and international supply chains);
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 175, at 11 (discussing the fertile environment for
counterfeiting due to “[n]ew global trade arrangements, free trade agreements and
deregulation” as well as “inequitable income and wealth distribution, and variable social
and economic development”); Marilynn Larkin, Combating Counterfeit Drugs Online, 6
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE 552, 552 (2006) (responding to concerns that the “Internet
has become ‘the primary tool for criminal organizations to advertise, communicate and
conduct sales of counterfeit pharmaceuticals’ ” with a compendium of anti-counterfeiting
online resources).
179. G. Jackson, S. Patel & S. Khan, Assessing the Problem of Counterfeit Medications
in the United Kingdom, 66 INT’L J. CLINICAL PRAC. 241, 242–43 (2011).
180. See, e.g., id. (reporting on concerns in the United Kingdom, European Union, and
United States); Mark Townsend, Health Fears Grow as Fake Drugs Flood Britain,
GUARDIAN: OBSERVER (U.K.) (Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009
/jan/04/fake-pharmaceuticals-drugs-china-nhs [http://perma.cc/8QLB-5ZJ6] (reporting on
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Alarmed that criminal enterprises are sending bad medicines
across borders into Europe, the Council of Europe drafted the first
international treaty on counterfeit medicines and related crimes—
dubbed the “MEDICRIME Convention”—which opened for
signature in October 2011.182 The Convention requires signatories to
criminalize manufacturing, supplying, or trafficking in counterfeit
medicines and to share data for law enforcement purposes.183 There
are forty-seven European nations represented by the Council of
Europe.184 In addition, in 2010, the Ministers of the Council of Europe
asked that the Convention be circulated widely with an invitation to
nonmember states to join.185 To date, however, only nineteen nations
have signed the Convention.186
While prominent stories about and seizures of counterfeit drugs
may rouse periodic attention, sustained attention and research is
difficult because of the scarcity of data on the issue.187 Data on the
scope of the problem are difficult to obtain because of the covert
nature of the illicit industry and severe underreporting, particularly in
the hardest-hit regions of the world.188 Making matters worse,
medicines are taken by the ill, elderly, and infirm.189 Even when
people sicken or die because of taking counterfeit or substandard
drugs, they may not realize it is because of the drug rather than the
illness.190 As Valerio Reggi, coordinator of the WHO anticounterfeit pills “made in China, labelled in French, and then shipped to Singapore”
where they “ended up in Liverpool and from there were sold straight into the heart of the
National Health System, Britain’s healthcare provider system”).
181. See, e.g., Buyer Beware: The Danger of Purchasing Pharmaceuticals Over the
Internet: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 108th Cong. 2–3
(2004) (discussing dangers of drugs illegally sold by online pharmacies and deaths due to
such drugs); Campbell et al., supra note 168, at 2943–49 (discussing findings regarding
counterfeit Viagra); Gardiner Harris, Medicines Made in India Set Off Safety Worries,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2014, at A1 (discussing concerns over entry of counterfeit drugs into
U.S. supply chain); FDA Warns Bogus Pills Contain Viagra, Cialis Drugs, FOXNEWS.COM
(May 13, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/05/13/fda-warns-bogus-pills-containviagra-cialis-drugs [http://perma.cc/3EZR-PXKB].
182. MEDICRIME Convention, supra note 166.
183. Id. at arts. 5–6, 11–12, 16–17.
184. The Medicrime Convention, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.edqm.eu/en/themedicrime-convention-1470.html [http://perma.cc/BXT7-GG23].
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Paul N. Newton et al., Counterfeit Anti-Infective Drugs, 6 LANCET
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 602, 602, 610 (2006) (noting the problem is “under-recognised[,]”
research in the area is limited, and there are data availability challenges).
188. See INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 85–128 (describing the data available about
medicine quality and the limitations of that data); Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303.
189. INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 15.
190. Id.
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counterfeiting taskforce explained, “It’s difficult to link a dead body
to a counterfeit drug bought at a street market.”191 Because of the
difficulty in measuring the trade in false pharmaceuticals and linking
deaths and illnesses to fake drugs, the Institute of Medicine recently
concluded: “Deaths from fake drugs go largely uncounted, to say
nothing of the excess morbidity and the time and money wasted by
using them.”192
Despite the difficulty in obtaining data, there have been attempts
to estimate the prevalence of counterfeit medicine; unsurprisingly,
these numbers vary widely because of the data deficit. Estimates
indicate that from 10% to over 50% of medicines in some parts of the
developing world are counterfeit.193 Though the WHO estimated in
2006 that the prevalence in upper-income countries like the United
States, Canada, and members of the European Union is less than 1%
of the drug supply,194 there are indications that sales of counterfeit
medicines may be growing because of the rise of Internet pharmacies
and other gray and black markets.195 Because of the scarcity of studies
on prevalence, many of the estimates of the magnitude of the
problem have relied on “gray literature” such as media reports of
cases that have surfaced or litigation documents.196
Field surveys that systematically and randomly sample and test
medicines from a representative cross section of a region’s or a
country’s markets offer the best estimates of the scope of the drugsupply problem.197 Such field surveys are difficult and potentially
prohibitively expensive to undertake, however, particularly in the
hardest-hit low- and middle-income nations with a large,
heterogeneous pool of gray markets.198 Only recently have attempts
191. Makiko Kitamura, West African Leaders Not Doing Enough To Stop Fake Drugs:
WHO, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 13, 2006, Westlaw (no unique identifier).
192. INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 16.
193. JULIAN MORRIS & PHILLIP STEVENS, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES IN LESSDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 3–4 (2006); Cockburn et al., supra
note 11, at 0303; Paul N. Newton, Michael D. Green & Facundo N. Fernández, Impact of
Poor-Quality Medicines in the ‘Developing’ World, 31 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCIS.
99, 99–100 (2010).
194. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: AN UPDATE ON ESTIMATES
(Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact/TheNewEsti
matesCounterfeit.pdf [http://perma.cc/SN2W-EAPC].
195. Facundo M. Fernández, Michael D. Green & Paul N. Newton, Prevalence and
Detection of Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Mini Review, 47 INDUS. & ENGINEERING
CHEMICAL RES. 585, 585 (2008); Jackson et al., supra note 179, at 242–43; WORLD
HEALTH ORG., supra note 194.
196. INST. OF MED., supra note 169, at 85, 94.
197. Id. at 102–03.
198. See id. at 103.

94 N.C. L. REV. 161 (2015)

192

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

been made to systematically quantify the prevalence of counterfeit
drugs. In 2011, the Promoting the Quality of Medicines program,
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development launched
its Medicines Quality Database (“MQDB”).199 Overseen by the U.S.
Pharmacopeial Convention, the database is a valuable development
because it allows access to data from participating countries on
samples of medicines tested pursuant to standardized guidelines to
enhance quality, validity, reliability, and comparability of the data
obtained.200 There are currently twelve participating countries,
contributing more than 12,500 records of drug tests in total.201 The
four longest-participating countries are Cambodia,202 Laos,203
Vietnam,204 and Thailand.205 While a promising start, the coverage
remains limited. Private partners are important in expanding the web
of surveillance—but effective surveillance is stymied by the veil of
secrecy surrounding counterfeiting information uncovered by
companies with the resources and expertise to investigate.206
II. WHY A CONSUMER-ORIENTED GENERAL DISCLOSURE MODEL
IS NOT ENOUGH
While corporate secrecy that stifles public protection is a
problem, general public disclosure is not a feasible cure in the
sensitive contexts where companies claim rights to corporate privacy
secured by trade secret, contract, or property law.207 As discussed in
Part I, some courts have held that general disclosure of protected

199. Medicines Quality Database (MQDB), U.S. PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION,
http://www.usp.org/global-health-impact-programs/promoting-quality-medicinespqmusaid/medicines-quality-database-mqdb [http://perma.cc/WS5A-AWZ5].
200. Laura A. Krech et al., The Medicines Quality Database: A Free Public Resource,
92 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 2 (2014), http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/bwho/v92n1/00429686-bwho-92-01-02.pdf [http://perma.cc/B522-AP3C].
201. Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam all
participate in the MQDB. The MQDB’s annual Quick Reports include data for each of
these listed countries. See Medicines Quality Database (MQDB), U.S. PHARMACOPEIAL
CONVENTION, http://www.usp.org/global-health-programs/promoting-quality-medicinespqmusaid/medicines-quality-database-mqdb (click “Access the MQDB”; agree to the
terms of use; select “Quick Report,” select a country from the list; click “next”; select a
year; click “next” to view results).
202. Data available for nine years, for 2003 and from 2005–2012. See id.
203. Data available for eight years, from 2003–2011. See id.
204. Data available for nine years, from 2003–2011. See id.
205. Data available for four years, from 2004–2005 and 2008–2009. See id. Guyana also
contributed four years, but the span was narrower, ranging from 2008 to 2011. See id.
206. Cockburn et al., supra note 11, at 0303.
207. See discussion and examples supra Part I.
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trade secrets—even to protect public health and safety—is an
unconstitutional taking of property without compensation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.208 Secret settlement agreements have been
routinely sanctioned by courts despite recurring controversy and
repeated congressional efforts to prohibit judicial sanction of
contracts preventing disclosure of information important to public
health and safety.209
Moreover, even where general disclosure might be an option, it
may not be the most effective way when balancing the costs of
disclosure with the benefits. This Part begins by discussing the
ascendant consumer-oriented approach to disclosure. The Part then
turns to why piling more disclosures on information-overloaded,
nonexpert consumers is not the most effective solution for the
private-data, public-safety conflict.
A. Consumer, Protect Thyself
In numerous contexts, from wastewater contamination to
financial disclosure laws, legislatures have enacted targeted
transparency regimes with disclosure as a centerpiece of efforts to
enable better protection.210 Two major aims of disclosure as a tool to
protect public health and safety include enabling informed consumer
choice and allowing consumers to self-protect to prevent harm.211 A
major assumption and goal of mandatory disclosure is a betterinformed individual decision maker, who Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl
E. Schneider dub “Chris Consumer.”212
Mandated disclosure works well for Chris Consumer when
information is stripped down and rendered into an accessible

208. See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
209. See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
210. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); INT’L FED’N OF
ACCOUNTANTS (IFAC), INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (IFRS):
AN AICPA BACKGROUNDER 2–3, 5–8 (2011), http://www.ifrs.com/pdf/ifrsupdate_v8.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q74D-GXTC] (providing an accessible overview of International
Financial Reporting Standards and their convergence and adoption history); FUNG ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 7–9, 12–13, 21–23, 92–105, 133–40 (offering numerous examples of
mandated disclosure including a discussion of water contamination disclosures as an
example of the pitfalls of complex disclosures to consumers and international corporate
financial reporting disclosure requirements as an example of a successful regime); Cass R.
Sunstein, Information Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U.
PA. L. REV. 613, 613–14, 618–25 (1999) (discussing the rise of information dissemination
requirements as a regulatory tool and offering numerous examples).
211. See discussion and examples infra notes 214–22.
212. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 705–10.
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decisional heuristic.213 An excellent example is the TREAD Act’s
savvy strategy of giving consumers digestible vehicle roll-over safety
information through a five-star rating system based on government
crash tests.214 The five-star crash rating system enables consumers to
exercise better-informed choice, rendering complex government
crash-test results an accessible decisional heuristic.215 Such disclosure
effectively enables informed consumption in light of known public
health and safety information with technical details removed.
Mandated disclosure is also used to facilitate consumer selfprotection. Data breach notification laws are an example. The laws
generally require businesses and governmental entities holding
personally identifiable information, such as account or credit card
numbers, to notify individuals when there is a breach involving
unauthorized access to such information.216 The aim of data breach
disclosure laws is to alert individuals so they can self-protect and
minimize damage from crimes such as identity theft.217
A thicket of data breach notification laws has rapidly grown and
spread since California enacted the nation’s first data breach
disclosure law in 2002.218 Today, forty-seven states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands all have

213. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1030–47 (2012).
214. See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (counting the TREAD Act as a success
giving “[i]nformation . . . new power because policymakers did not stop at simply placing
facts about risks in the public domain—where they could be easily lost in the cacophony of
new-car hype” but instead “required that information be presented in a format that was
designed to be user-centered” through a “simple five-star ratings [system] based on
government tests of each new model”).
215. NHTSA Final Policy Statement on Consumer Information; New Car Assessment
Program; Rollover Resistance, 68 Fed. Reg. 59,250, 59,250 (Oct. 14, 2003) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 575).
216. For a list of legislation, see Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/4687SZL2] (listing state data breach notification laws).
217. See, e.g., Cal. S.B. No. 1386, § 1 (2002) (enacted) (explaining the law’s aim to
ensure timely notification to potential victims of identity theft so that individuals can “act
quickly to minimize the damage”); Council Directive 2009/136, art. 59, 2009 O.J. (L 337)
11, 19 (EC) (“[T]he notification of security breaches reflects the general interest of citizens
in being informed of security failures which could result in their personal data being lost or
otherwise compromised, as well as of available or advisable precautions that they could
take in order to minimize the possible economic loss or social harm that could result from
such failures.”).
218. Cal. S.B. No. 1386 (signed by the Governor, Sept. 25, 2002) (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1798.29, .82, .84 (West 2012, Westlaw through Ch. 807 of the 2015 Reg. Sess. &
Ch. 1 of 2015–2016 Ex. Sess.)).
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data breach notification laws.219 Congress is also considering
numerous proposals for a federal data breach notification law to
standardize the obligations that companies face and enable
consumers to better self-protect.220
Companies operating in the United States currently face a
daunting patchwork of data breach notification laws.221 The laws
differ in several ways, including on (1) the definition of the time
period in which businesses have to notify consumers of a data breach
affecting them; (2) whether failure to notify results in civil or criminal
penalties and what those penalties are; (3) whether the people
affected have a private right of action; (4) whether access to
encrypted data is exempt; and (5) whether immaterial breaches are
exempt from disclosure and how to define them. The need to
harmonize state laws and recent, high-profile, large data breaches at
businesses such as Target, Home Depot, Sony, and JPMorgan have
spurred efforts toward a federal data breach law.222 The content of

219. See Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 216 (listing legislation and
noting that these laws require companies holding sensitive consumer information to notify
consumers in case of a data breach).
220. E.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2014, S. 2378, 113th Cong.
(introduced May 21, 2014); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4400, 113th Cong.
(introduced Apr. 4, 2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2014, S. 1976,
113th Cong. (introduced Jan. 30, 2014); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of
2013, S. 1193, 113th Cong. (introduced June 20, 2013); SECURE IT, H.R. 1468, 113th
Cong. (introduced Apr. 10, 2013).
221. See, e.g., Protecting Small Businesses Against Emerging and Complex CyberAttacks, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. 14–15 (2013) (statement of Dan Shapero, founder of
“ClikCloud,” on behalf of CompTIA) (“Who do I notify? Which of those 47 states am I
required to disclose to when I have lost data from my consumers?”).
222. See, e.g., Sony and Epsilon: Lessons for Data Security Legislation: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
112th Cong. 1–3 (2011) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono Mack, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade) (discussing the need for a federal data breach law as
illustrated by the “massive data breaches at Sony and Epsilon”); Protecting Small
Businesses Against Emerging and Complex Cyber-Attacks, supra note 221, at 60 (noting
recent high-profile breaches); Matthew Goldstein & Nicole Perlroth, Luck Helped in
Discovery of Breach at JPMorgan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2014, at B1 (detailing discovery of
large attack over the summer on JPMorgan affecting the data of 76 million households and
seven million small businesses); Myriad Congressional Initiatives Add Up to Incremental
Progress on Cybersecurity, INSIDE CYBERSECURITY, Jan. 28, 2014, Westlaw, 2014 WLNR
2560669 (reporting on impetus to pass federal data breach legislation after revelation of
large data breaches at Target and other retailers). For a beautiful data visualization of
major cyberattacks, see World’s Biggest Data Breaches, INFORMATION IS BEAUTIFUL,
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
(last updated Aug. 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8K6L-8X9Y].
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such a law is hotly contested, however, stalling efforts to enact a
federal data breach notification law for nearly a decade.223
Companies disagree among themselves about what the content
of data breach notification laws should be, depending on the industry
sector. For example, the entity representing federal credit unions is
advocating mandatory “disclosure of identities of companies and
merchants whose data systems have been violated so consumers are
aware of those that place their personal information at risk.”224 This
desire for identification—and the incentives to improve that come
from identification—stem from concern that credit unions and other
financial institutions bear the brunt of the costs of helping consumers
after data breaches of retailers’ systems, such as issuing new cards,
replacing stolen funds, and dealing with the greater volume of
customer service needs.225 A federal credit union representative
expressed concern that, while financial institutions pay the costs,
“[t]he negligent entity that caused these expenses by failing to protect
consumer data loses nothing, and is often undisclosed to the
consumer.”226
Other industry executives argue that data breaches can be
quietly addressed without alarming consumers and drawing negative
publicity in cases where data was accessed but not stolen, or stolen
but not used.227 Some business leaders also express concern that
revealing a breach alerts other hackers to exploitable weaknesses.228
A third cluster of arguments centers around cyberattacks by nationstates through their intelligence agents on companies with sensitive

223. See, e.g., Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 751, 109th Cong. (2005)
(not passed); Judy Greenwald, Pressure Builds for Federal Action on Uniform Approach
to Data Laws: Legislative Progress Uncertain in 2012, BUS. INS., Jan. 2, 2012, at 14–15
(noting history of several data breach bills); Grant Gross, Year End: Congress Slow on
Tech Issues in ‘07, INFOWORLD DAILY (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www.infoworld.com/article
/2650037/application-development/year-end--congress-slow-on-tech-issues-in--07.html
[http://perma.cc/Q78D-6EPS] (discussing legislative defeats); see also Paul M. Schwartz &
Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 932, 932–65
(2007) (discussing different models of disclosure laws).
224. Protecting Small Businesses Against Emerging and Complex Cyber-Attacks, supra
note 221, at 61 (statement of Brad Thaler, Vice President, Legislative Affairs, Nat’l Ass’n
of Fed. Credit Unions) (noting recent high-profile breaches).
225. Id. at 59–60.
226. Id. at 60.
227. Danny Yadron, Executives Rethink Merits of Going Public With Data Breaches,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/a-contrarian-view-on-databreaches-1407194237 [http://perma.cc/5E3H-G9GN].
228. Id.
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national security or intellectual property information.229 Because such
attacks are aimed at obtaining national security- or national
competitiveness-related information, the materiality for everyday
consumers may be lessened and is counterbalanced by the sensitivity
of the information for covert investigation and foreign relations
purposes.230 These arguments highlight a larger concern with
mandated disclosure—that information would be better utilized by
experts and may even prove counterproductive if generally released.
B.

Mandated Disclosure and Its Discontents

While disclosure, also termed targeted transparency, is
increasingly ascendant as a regulatory tool, it is also controversial.
There is a growing body of literature debating the problems with
mandatory disclosure and how to fix them.231 There is also growing
scrutiny of the promulgation of transparency as “a pervasive cliché of
modern governance” given “uncritical reverence.”232 The idea behind
transparency is making information public to inform and improve
individual choices on how to consume, invest, vote, and make other
important decisions—and to monitor and improve the behavior of
information disclosers who must be attentive to market preferences.233
The reality may fall short of theory, however.234
One of the most powerful and repeated critiques regarding the
ineffectiveness of disclosures is that the typical individual is
overloaded with information.235 Information overload can arise from
229. See, e.g., Cybersecurity Roundtable, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, at 0020: 13–24 (Mar.
26, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable/cybersecurity-roundtable
-transcript.txt [http://perma.cc/6U6P-YUZL] (statement of Leslie Thornton, General
Counsel of WGL Holdings, Inc.) (discussing “nation-states, spies who seek to steal our
national security secrets or our intellectual property” as a “threat vector”).
230. See id. at 0077–78 (“[T]here’s materiality and then there’s materiality . . . . [Y]ou
wouldn’t necessarily disclose a nation-state actor trying to do harm in an industry that’s
very vulnerable . . . particularly if in that situation you don’t have a customer base or an
employee base that has been compromised because that’s not what they’re after[.]”).
231. E.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at xii–xiv, 171–82; Ben-Shahar & Schneider,
supra note 25, at 705–10; Calo, supra note 213, at 1030–47; Richard Craswell, Static Versus
Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not To Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV.
333, 369–77 (2013); Aarti Gupta, Transparency Under Scrutiny: Information Disclosure in
Global Environmental Governance, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 1–5 (2008); Clifford
Winston, The Efficacy of Information Policy, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 704, 705–10
(2008).
232. Christopher Hood, Transparency in Historical Perspective, in TRANSPARENCY:
THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 3 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006).
233. FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at xi.
234. Id.
235. E.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 705–10, 716–20; James Gibson,
Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 174–78 (2013) (discussing rising
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detailed disclosure requirements and from the accumulation of many
disclosures in various domains of an individual’s life.236 Moreover, the
typical consumer is likely to have mediocre literacy or numeracy skills
and therefore is unable to digest disclosures effectively.237
In short, the hope for a better-informed choice is a false one.238
Yet the fiction is sustained because regulation by disclosures looks
attractively cheap—to legislators at least—because there is no need
for government expenditures to engage in expensive oversight or to
hammer out detailed conduct rules and monitor them.239
In addition to the critiques of mandated disclosure in the
literature, the private-data, public-safety conflicts discussed thus far
illustrate two additional, major limitations of consumer-oriented
general disclosure. First, general disclosure is better suited for alerting
the public to known dangers rather than detecting and preventing
them.240 Second, general disclosure may not be feasible where
information is proprietary, raising Fifth Amendment takings clause
concerns when the government requires release of the information to
the general public.241 To address these concerns, the next Part
discusses a fresh approach to information access to reduce
constitutional concerns and otherwise prohibitive costs to business
interests while still allowing sufficient bounded access to detect and
prevent threats to public health and safety.
III. EXPERT-ORIENTED BOUNDED ACCESS
Despite all the critiques,242 general public disclosure is still nice—
if you can get it. Too often, however, companies prevail in arguing
about the perils of general public disclosure.243 Rather than allowing
data that is important to public health and safety to be locked away
altogether, another approach short of consumer-oriented public
information processing costs); see also, e.g., Mark I. Hwang & Jerry W. Lin, Information
Dimension, Information Overload and Decision Quality, 25 J. INFO. SCI. 213, 213–16
(1999) (summarizing studies on poor decisional quality by individuals facing information
overload).
236. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 686–90; Gibson, supra note 235, at
174–78 (discussing rising information processing costs).
237. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 711–15.
238. Id. at 705–29.
239. Id. at 682 (noting disclosure looks cheap because it “requires almost no
government expenditures, and its costs seem to be imposed the story’s villain, the stronger
party who withholds information”).
240. See discussion supra Section II.A.
241. See discussion supra Section I.A.
242. See discussion supra Section II.B.
243. See discussion and examples supra notes 50–54, 67–84, 86–98.
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disclosure is needed. This Article proposes bounded access as a way
to unlock such important protected information for an audience best
suited to use it. Such a model would allow access to otherwise
protected private data by experts and motivated groups. Only those
with the ability to design and adhere to a data protection plan to
ensure use is for the purpose of addressing important public health
and safety issues would be allowed to access the database.
The bounded access approach can be used in lieu of general
public disclosure where public disclosure is otherwise barred by
protections for trade secrets, property law, or contractual
confidentiality terms.244 Bounded access is also a way to ameliorate
the powerful business objections that general disclosure of sensitive
information might otherwise defeat progress.245 Finally, even where
general public disclosure is available, a bounded access regime may
give experts more richly detailed information with which to detect
and prevent public health and safety harms.
A. Expert Rather than Lay Audience
The bounded access concept proposed here is a model of data
disclosure that begins with approval of a data protection protocol and
discloses information to persons with the training to analyze the data
needed to detect and prevent public health and safety hazards. To
gain bounded access, users would need to demonstrate that data
access would serve a public or safety purpose and submit a data
protection protocol, including demonstrated safeguards. Rather than
piling more disclosures on the bewildered, information-overloaded
general consumer, bounded access is limited to trained professionals
such as researchers who are ethically obligated to comply with datause and protection safeguards and attorneys who are ethically bound
to abide by limitations on disclosure. Such trained and motivated
information-seekers are also better suited to maximize the value of
disclosure by using their expertise to detect potential threats to public
safety.
As a first line of detection and defense, public health researchers
are a crucial audience for bounded access. Today, such researchers
are bound by a web of laws, regulations, and ethical principles that
244. See discussion and examples supra Part I.
245. See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2011, H.R. 592, 112th Cong. (introduced
Feb. 9, 2011) (died); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2010, H.R. 5419, 111th Cong.
(introduced May 26, 2010) (died); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009, H.R. 1508, 111th
Cong. (introduced Mar. 12, 2009) (died); Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2008, H.R. 5884,
110th Cong. (introduced Apr. 23, 2008) (died); see also discussion supra notes 156–65.
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safeguard research subjects and protect against nonconsensual
disclosures of personally identifiable data.246 Sanctions for violations
of such protections for sensitive data can extend beyond professional
penalties to include civil and criminal penalties.247 Researchers thus
have deep expertise in complying with complex limits on the uses of
data and revelation of identifiable information that may prove
damaging. Researchers also have expertise in conducting analyses
with de-identified data to extract important information while
limiting any damage to an individual entity.248
Disclosure to such trained professionals can contain limitations
to mitigate any potential damage to individual private entities, such as
prohibiting the release of individually identifiable information while
facilitating research. Such protected access overcomes Fifth
Amendment takings claims that have bedeviled attempts at
mandating public disclosure of public health, safety, and
environmental information implicating trade secrets.249 Courts have
held that protective orders limiting access to permitted users and for
specified purposes obviate the Fifth Amendment takings issue
triggered by compelled disclosure of trade secrets.250 While bounded
access is different than a protective order, which is typically limited to
the facts and parties in specific litigation, its user and use restrictions
should similarly obviate Fifth Amendment takings concerns.
Limiting the audience renders disclosure nonpublic, averting
Fifth Amendment takings concerns.251 For example, the D.C. Circuit

246. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 45 (2009) (providing privacy protections for human subjects
during government research, including IRB review); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2013)
(providing protections for electronic health information); National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont
Report, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Apr. 18, 1979), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp
/policy/belmont.html [http://perma.cc/LD89-95F8] (summarizing basic ethical guidelines
by which to protect human subjects in government research).
247. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2012).
248. Indeed, de-identifying information for analyses is a vibrant area of scholarly
activity. See, e.g., Robert J. Bayardo & Rakesh Agrawal, Data Privacy Through Optimal
K-Anonymization, 21 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON DATA ENGINEERING 217, 217–18 (2005);
James Gardner & Li Xiong, An Integrated Framework for De-Identifying Unstructured
Medical Data, 68 DATA & KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 1441, 1442 (2009); Bradley Malin,
Kathleen Benitez & Daniel Masys, Never Too Old for Anonymity: A Statistical Standard
for Demographic Data Sharing via the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 18 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 3, 3–5 (2011).
249. See discussion and examples supra notes 100–37.
250. Griffith v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., No. 11-CV-7615, 2013 WL
104921, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013); Republic Servs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Cos., No.
Civ. A. 03-494-KSF, 2006 WL 1635655, at *7 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2006).
251. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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in Exxon Corp. v. FTC252 held that a release of business information,
including trade secrets, to Congress is not public divulgement, and
thus “does not impair the value of the trade secrets involved . . . [or]
involve a deprivation prior to which a hearing is required.”253
Responding to the claim that Congress may publicly disclose the
released information, the D.C. Circuit held that “[c]ourts must
presume that the committees of Congress will exercise their powers
responsibly and with due regard for the rights of affected parties.”254
In other words, we are all professionals here. Courts may presume
that professionals will comply with protections accompanying
specific-purpose and limited-audience disclosure of information
important to public safety.
B.

Epidemiological Insights on Privacy and Public Protection

The bounded access proposal draws insights from epidemiology,
the science of detecting and preventing threats to public health.255
Epidemiology investigates the patterns and causes of threats to health
and safety in populations of people.256 An important tool in this
endeavor is amassing and using sensitive, highly private data for
public health surveillance.257 The goal of disease surveillance is to
systematically gather and pool data to detect the causes, prevalence,
incidences, and consequences of injury or disease.258 Data sharing and
pooling for disease surveillance has venerable roots running back to
the nineteenth century in U.S. and international practice.259 For
example, public health surveillance led to the discovery that a
defective vaccine had caused polio in 40,000 children and left 200
children paralyzed.260 Such epidemiological surveillance also led to
the linkage between high-absorbency tampons and toxic shock

252.
253.
254.
255.

589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 589.
Id.
See NOEL S. WEISS & THOMAS D. KOEPSELL, EPIDEMIOLOGIC METHODS:
STUDYING THE OCCURRENCE OF ILLNESS 10 (2d ed. 2014).
256. Id.
257. Scott F. Wetterhall & Eric K. Noji, Surveillance and Epidemiology, in THE
PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTERS 37 (Eric K. Noji ed., 1997).
258. Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s
Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 82
(1999).
259. For histories, see, for example, FUNG ET AL., supra note 26, at 142; Denise Koo &
Scott F. Wetterhall, History and Current Status of the National Notifiable Diseases
Surveillance System, 2 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 4, 4–8 (1996).
260. For a history, see Michael Fitzpatrick, The Cutter Incident: How America’s First
Polio Vaccine Led to a Growing Vaccine Crisis, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 156, 156 (2006).
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syndrome.261 Trying to detect threats to population health without
such data pooling would be laboring “in the darkness of ignorance,”
as Assistant Surgeon General J.W. Trask put it in 1915.262
Epidemiological surveillance often involves the collection of
highly sensitive data such as HIV or other infectious disease status.263
Such information is publicly reported at the aggregate level with
strong protections against damaging disclosure about particular
individuals.264 The discipline of epidemiology thus has important
insights about protecting privacy without stifling the generation of
knowledge about threats to public health and safety.
While disease surveillance is often conducted by governmental
entities,265 the discipline of epidemiology also shows the import of
making data available to nongovernmental researchers for analysis.
Many expert eyes are needed to advance protection and prevention
(indeed, imagine where biomedical science and technology would be
in a world where only the government conducted research). The task
of uncovering and combatting threats to public health and safety
cannot just be centralized within the government.266 The recent GM
and NHTSA fiasco illustrates the risks of such an approach.267 While
the government has an important role to play in gathering and
disseminating information, much of the data gathering and analysis is
conducted by nongovernmental researchers with specialized
expertise. Nongovernmental, expert eyes, such as researchers or
consumer protection attorneys, are like beneficial microbes for the
261. For the epidemiology of the link, see Seth F. Berkley et al., The Relationship of
Tampon Characteristics to Menstrual Toxic Shock Syndrome, 258 JAMA 917, 917, 920
(1987). But see Walter F. Schlech III et al., Risk Factors for Development of Toxic Shock
Syndrome: Association with a Tampon Brand, 248 JAMA 835, 838–39 (1982).
262. John W. Trask, Public Health Administration: Its Dependence upon Reports of
Sickness, 28 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1, 2 (1913).
263. See, e.g., AMY L. FAIRCHILD, RONALD BAYER & JAMES COLGROVE,
SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA
66–80 (2007) (discussing the surveillance of conditions such as sexually transmitted
diseases).
264. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Guidelines for National
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Case Surveillance, Including Monitoring for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 48
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS., Dec. 10, 1999, at
1, 14–16 (No. RR-13).
265. See, e.g., DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF
DISEASE 50–52 (2004) (discussing the state-centrism of international public health
regimes).
266. See, e.g., id. at 50–57 (discussing the role of nonstate actors in promoting public
health).
267. See discussion supra Section I.B.2; see also, e.g., REVIEW OF NHTSA, supra note
153, at 1–2 (investigating why NHTSA missed early warning signs).
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surveillance and investigation system, unearthing important factors
for threat detection and prevention and airing issues in need of
attention.
C.

Two Tracks of Disclosure: Thick, Rich Information and Thin,
Digestible Information

The data needs for an expert audience are very different from
those of “Chris Consumer,” who represents the paradigmatic
audience for mandated disclosure policies and critiques.268 For the
individual consumer to effectively digest information, the information
needs to be made thin and grabby—pared down and rendered catchy
through images or sounds that seize rather than dull attention.269 For
population-level surveillance and protection, disclosures should be
thick and detail rich—precisely the opposite of effective disclosures
for individuals. It is also important to offer technical disclosures
detailing sampling techniques as well as the raw data to permit
effective systematic study.270
This difference in form arises from the difference in uses of data.
While consumers and other individuals seek identifying information
to make choices among goods or services, data disseminated to
experts for population-level protection needs to be detail rich to
enable detection of patterns of harm and to enable more effective
prevention. While bounded access limits the audience for
information, it should allow for more meaningful information for
purposes of harm detection and prevention.
Disclosure of such important data exacts costs on the reporting
entities. In addition to informing the design of disclosures, an
epidemiological perspective also provides insights about how to
address concerns about damage resulting from disclosure. At the
national level, public health surveillance similarly calls for collection
of sensitive data, including disease findings that implicate patient

268. See discussion supra notes 210–17.
269. See, e.g., Sullivan v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 649 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2011)
(recommending paring down informational forms to “focus on what matters most” to help
employees make “intelligent retirement decisions”); Calo, supra note 213, at 1030–47
(detailing how creative forms of “visceral notice” that rouse attention can be more
effective than traditional notice).
270. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Reconstruction of Private Indicators for Public
Purposes, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS 165, 179 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012) (arguing
that raw data and information about sampling techniques should be accessible so that
indicators can more meaningfully be used to improve governance).
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privacy.271 At the international level, disease surveillance also calls for
reporting potentially embarrassing data that might have economic
repercussions for nations reporting disease outbreaks.272 Moreover,
epidemiological research often operates on sensitive human-subject
data, including protected medical records.273
The corporate privacy interest secured through trade secret,
contract, and propertization is far less compelling than a person’s
privacy interest in health data. As the Supreme Court has explained,
unlike human subjects, corporations “are endowed with public
attributes” because “[t]hey have a collective impact upon society,
from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.”274
Moreover, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) reflects a democratic judgment about the intensely
private nature of health information.275 Yet even after the enactment
of HIPAA, researchers have access to patient health data to enable
public health research to detect and prevent harms.276 A fortiori,
privacy should not be a bar to access in the less compelling context of
corporate privacy.
Moreover, epidemiological research practices such as deidentification can help inform the scope of protection for particularly
sensitive business information. Since the passage of HIPAA,
researchers have further refined strategies for using de-identified data
that is pooled and aggregated to detect public health threats.277 Where
companies have a particularly compelling need for protection and
where de-identification does not render investigation infeasible,
bounded disclosure could include only data stripped of identifiers
linking the information to a particular brand or company.

271. For a discussion, see, for example, FAIRCHILD ET AL., supra note 263, at 66–80;
Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 564–67 (2011); Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance:
Toward Better Informed Sexual Consent, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 7
(2012).
272. For a discussion, see, for example, FIDLER, supra note 265, at 34–48; FUNG ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 142.
273. See, e.g., Jacquelyn K. O’Herrin, Norman Fost & Kenneth A. Kudsk, Health
Insurance Portability Act (HIPAA) Regulations: Effect on Medical Record Research, 239
ANNALS SURGERY 772, 772–76 (2004) (discussing navigating HIPAA requirements in
medical records research).
274. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
275. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
276. Roberta B. Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298
JAMA 2164, 2164–68 (2007).
277. Id.
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Because disclosure to the research public is different from
disclosure to the consuming, individual public, there should be two
tracks of disclosure. The disclosure track at the consumer level should
draw on insights about paring down information and making data
more digestible.278 The second track of disclosure to the research
public should be detail rich with sufficient technical information to
facilitate standardization and adjustment for statistical analyses.279
Access could be restricted to researchers with the proper credentials
and who have IRB clearance, ensuring sufficient controls are in place
to protect sensitive data.280
In some circumstances, the two-track model may become just a
single, higher-track model of disclosure where an industry or
company succeeds in convincing legislators that information is
particularly sensitive. Even if there is not sufficient consensus for
mandating general individual-level disclosure, there should be
bounded access to public health, safety, and environmental
information. Ultimately, reducing the costs of disclosure is a better
way to improve the generation of data from multiple sources.
Reducing the costs of cooperation is more desirable than coercing
resistant entities because there are innumerable creative ways to
resist, thereby undermining mandated general public disclosure.281
CONCLUSION
Challenging the conventional view that there is no right to
privacy for corporations, this Article has illuminated how companies
enjoy plenty of privacy through trade secret, contract, and the
propertization of information.282 These regimes create business
privacy by other means and are backed by sanctions.283 Data
278. See discussion supra Section II.A.
279. See discussion supra Section II.B.
280. Cf. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.);
45 C.F.R. § 164.501, .508, .512, .514 (2014) (establishing IRB for HIPAA and outlining
requirements for approval for use of medical data by covered entities for research
purposes).
281. For some colorful illustrations, see, for example, Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the
Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 582–83, 631
(2012).
282. For expressions of the conventional rule, see, for example, United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[C]orporations can claim no equality with
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652I cmt. c. (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“A corporation . . . has no right to privacy.”).
283. See discussion supra Section I.A. For the oft-repeated conventional view, see, for
example, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284
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ownership and control has the power to illuminate or obscure dangers
to public health and safety. Keeping experts and the public data
impoverished can impact what makes it onto the policy and research
agenda, what receives sustained attention, and what is underrecognized or hidden until the victim counts rise and become too high
to overlook. 284
For some major public safety and security challenges, such as
deaths from auto defects, toxic emissions, hazardous products, and
drug counterfeiting, crucial data is controlled by private industry
actors. The data is private in two senses—it is both proprietary and
secluded from scrutiny. When the interests in private data and public
safety conflict, what should the law do?
This Article proposes bounded access as a fresh approach to
addressing the legal, theoretical, and practical limitations of
consumer-oriented general public disclosure. Where information is
propertized, general public access—even to protect public health and
safety—may not be feasible because of Fifth Amendment takings
concerns.285 Even if there are not constitutional barriers, there may be
formidable political barriers, as illustrated by the repeated demise of
the sunshine in litigation acts introduced in Congress over the years.286
Moreover, even where general disclosure might be an option,
information-overloaded consumers may not be best situated to utilize
the information effectively to detect and prevent threats to health and
safety.287
A bounded access model of disclosure addresses these challenges
by unlocking otherwise protected private data to grant access to
experts capable of effectively using data to detect health and safety
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A] corporation is ‘an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ As such, it
is not entitled to ‘ “purely personal” guarantees’ whose ‘ “historic function” has been
limited to the protection of individuals.’ Thus, a corporation has no . . . right to privacy.”
(internal ellipses and citations omitted)); Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652
(“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy.”); Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The District
Court correctly found that, as an entity, Baker ‘clearly had no privacy interest’ . . . . ”
(internal brackets omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters., Inc. v. NDC of Cal., L.P., Civ. No. 09145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[B]usiness entities do not
have a right to privacy.”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548
(Mass. 1998) (“Cases from other jurisdictions unanimously deny a right of privacy to
corporations.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1977)
(“A corporation as such has no right to privacy.”).
284. See discussion and examples supra Section I.B.
285. See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
286. See discussion supra notes 157–245.
287. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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harms while honoring data protections. The bounded access model
can be used where general public disclosure is barred by
constitutional or other protections for propertized information or is
otherwise not feasible because of political opposition to general
public disclosure. Bounded access may also be valuable in addition to
general public disclosure by giving experts richer, more technically
detailed information, permitting effective investigation to detect and
prevent public health and safety harms. Companies thereby retain a
form of privacy. They retain control over their proprietary
information for most purposes, with only a limited, safeguarded
release for threat detection. The goal of this fresh approach is to
maximize risk-detection and harm-prevention capabilities, while
reducing the incentives to conceal damaging information for fear of
harming a particular brand or product.

